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We study competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain 
over their form and terms of trading. Both (conditionally) inefficient wholesale price 
contracts and efficient contracts that take the form of price-quantity bundles (and not 
of two-tariffs) arise in equilibrium under different parameter configurations. Changes 
in bargaining power distribution affect market outcomes by altering the trading terms 
and, more importantly, the trading form. As a result, a firm might benefit by a 
reduction in its bargaining power and consumers could benefit from an increase in the 
downstream “countervailing power” or from a more uneven bargaining power 
distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We study transactions between firms that operate at different stages of a vertical 
supply chain, such as input producers and final good manufacturers or wholesalers 
and retailers - “upstream” and “downstream” firms in general. A standard assumption 
in the existing literature is that downstream firms play a passive role in these 
transactions. We assume instead that the downstream firms are large players that 
participate actively not only in setting their final market prices, but also in 
determining how they trade with their upstream suppliers. Within this framework, a 
number of fundamental issues arise: How  is vertical trading organized? How do 
bilateral negotiations between large upstream and downstream firms affect their form 
and terms of trading? How do final market outcomes depend on the distribution of 
bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firms? Do final 
consumers benefit from the “countervailing” power of large downstream firms? What 
is the role of strategic competition across chains?  This set of questions is not only of 
theoretical interest but also of practical importance.  
Downstream firms are in many cases large players, actively involved in shaping 
their contracts with their suppliers, as the widespread evidence of increased 
concentration in the downstream sectors of many industries suggests. The food 
industry, in which large “supermarkets” become increasingly stronger in trading with 
their suppliers, is one of the examples that have recently received significant 
attention.
1 The picture is similar in many other industries: large tour operators trading 
with airlines and hotels, car manufacturers purchasing car parts, large book retailers 
(e.g. Barnes & Noble) dealing with publishers, large clothing retailers or, indeed, 
general retailers in both the U.S. (e.g. Wal-Mart) and Europe (e.g. Carrefour).
2  
We employ the simplest model that allows us to study transactions in competing 
vertical chains when both the upstream and the downstream firms participate actively 
in the determination of their form and terms of trade. There are two vertical chains, 
each consisting of one upstream and one downstream firm. The firms play a three-
stage game with observable actions. At the first stage, within each vertical chain the 
                                                 
1 See e.g. European Commission report (1999), and OECD report (1999). In 1996, the five largest food 
retailers had a 64% market share in the U.K., 61% in the Netherlands, 52% in France, and 41% in 
Germany, while the concentration in food retailing in Europe exceeded the concentration in food 
manufacturing and there was evidence of increased net margins for the top retailers (Dobson and 
Waterson, 1999). 
2 See e.g. “Barnes & Noble to Try to Squeeze Better Publisher Deals”, The New York Times, November 
26, 2001, and “How Big Can it Grow”, The Economist, April 15, 2004.   2
upstream and downstream firm bargain in order to determine their form of trading. 
The possible trading forms, or contract types, are: a (linear) wholesale price contract, 
a two-part tariff contract, and a price-quantity “bundle” (or “package,” specifying the 
total input quantity and its corresponding total price). At the second stage, the 
upstream and downstream firm in each chain bargain over the contract terms of their 
previously selected contract types. Finally, at the third stage, downstream firms 
produce differentiated final goods and compete in quantities.  
We show that upstream-downstream bargaining plays an important role in vertical 
trading not only because it affects the terms of trade but, more importantly, because it 
can also affect the form of trade emerging in different industries. Since different 
trading forms can appear in the presence of bargaining than in its absence, our 
analysis highlights the role of bargaining power distribution for vertical supply chains 
outcomes. We show that, while in the absence of bargaining, i.e. when all power is 
either upstream or downstream, “conditionally efficient” contracts are dominant, in 
the presence of bargaining, “conditionally inefficient” contracts such as (linear) 
wholesale price contracts may arise. Also, within the set of conditionally efficient 
contracts, two-part tariffs are always dominated by price-quantity bundles, and thus, 
never arise in equilibrium (though socially optimal). Our analysis thus reveals that 
price-quantity bundle contracts, which have been largely ignored in the literature, 
consist a significant form of trading within vertical chains.
3   
The intuition for these results lies on the features of the different contract types. 
As mentioned above, both price-quantity bundles and two-part tariffs are 
conditionally efficient contracts, that is, lead to the maximization of the “pie” (i.e. the 
vertical chain’s joint profits), given the rival chain’s strategy. Yet, price-quantity 
bundles are preferred to two-part tariffs, due to their superior commitment value. In 
particular, a vertical chain, by using a price-quantity bundle contract, is able to 
commit to a certain final output level before reaching the final market competition 
stage. On the other hand, wholesale price contracts do not lead to the maximization of 
a chain’s joint profits (conditional on rival behavior), since in the absence of fixed 
fees there is double marginalization. However, they may arise in equilibrium, as they 
turn out to be an attractive choice for non-very powerful downstream firms. Due to 
the absence of transfers, a wholesale price plays a double role: not only controls how 
                                                 
3 Björnerstedt and Stennek (2004), Kolay and Shaffer (2003), and Rey and Tirole (2003) are some 
exceptions that also consider such contracts, however, their focus is very different from ours.   3
aggressive the downstream firm in the final good market is, but it also determines 
how the surplus is shared within the chain. As a result, a downstream firm with little 
power is allowed to keep a larger share of the (otherwise smaller) pie under a 
wholesale price contract than under a price-quantity bundle contract. An implication 
of the above is that product differentiation, by shifting the emphasis from strategic 
competition vis-à-vis the rival chain to how the surplus is divided within the chain, 
makes wholesale price contracts more likely to appear. 
  Since a change in the distribution of bargaining power may lead to the adoption of 
different trading forms, it can also lead to drastic changes in the levels of firm’s 
profits, consumers’ surplus, and total welfare.  Interestingly, we find that a firm - 
upstream or downstream - might benefit from a reduction in its own bargaining 
power.  The intuition comes from the fact that a change in the allocation of the 
bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firms can affect the 
equilibrium outcomes not only through changes in the contract terms but, more 
importantly, through changes in the contract types. In particular, from the viewpoint 
of a downstream firm, although a reduction in its bargaining power means that it 
captures a smaller share of the pie, it can also mean a more favourable way of 
dividing the pie due to the possible appearance of wholesale price contracts. From the 
viewpoint of an upstream firm, while an increase in its bargaining power leads to an 
increase in its share of the pie, it can also lead to a smaller pie and a less favourable 
way of dividing it, through the appearance of conditionally inefficient contracts. 
  An analysis along the above lines also allows us to address the following 
important question: since in an increasing number of markets “countervailing” power 
of large retailers becomes a significant factor, does such a force operate in the benefit 
of consumers and total welfare? We find that an increase in the “countervailing” 
power of downstream firms can, under certain conditions, be beneficial both for the 
consumers and welfare. This is so because wholesale price contracts, that imply high 
final market prices, do not appear in equilibrium when the downstream bargaining 
power is sufficiently high. Interestingly enough, we also find that a more even 
distribution of bargaining power may turn out to be harmful both for the consumers 
and total welfare. When the distribution of bargaining power within chains is extreme, 
conditionally efficient contracts, that due to the absence of double marginalization 
lead to lower final prices, tend to arise.   4
Some important modifications of our basic model are also considered in the paper. 
First, we enlarge the set of possible trading forms, by allowing each vertical chain to 
vertically integrate. We show that this option is strategically weaker than trading via a 
price-quantity bundle contract (because such contracts have a commitment value). 
Second, we relax the assumption made in the main body of the analysis that the price-
quantity bundles have direct “downstream quantity commitment” (that is, the 
downstream firm’s final output is directly dictated by the input quantity specified in 
the contract). We show that our main results hold true, independently of whether the 
price-quantity bundles are with or without downstream quantity commitment, at least 
as long as the marginal production cost of the input is not too low. Intuitively, a 
vertical chain can still commit (indirectly) to aggressive downstream behavior by 
employing such a contract, because it can induce its downstream firm to act as a zero 
marginal cost competitor (up to the specified input quantity) during the final market 
competition stage.
4 Third, we exclude by assumption price-quantity bundles (as most 
of the related literature has also done) and analyze the case in which the choice of 
contracts is only between two-part tariffs and wholesale prices. We find that, in the 
absence of price-quantity bundles, the appearance of wholesale price contracts 
becomes more likely.
5 
  Our paper is related to an extensive and influential literature on strategic vertical 
contracting.
6 In particular, it is more closely related to work that has focused on how 
vertical contracts influence downstream competition.
7 An important difference 
between our paper and the existing literature is that the latter has ignored the role of 
bargaining in the endogenous organization of vertical trading. For instance, while 
Gal-Or (1991) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995) have endogenized the choice among two-
part tariff and wholesale price contracts, they have analyzed only the unilateral 
incentives of the upstream firms. In particular, in a setting in which the contract types 
used by two competing vertical chains are chosen before the terms, and the 
                                                 
4 Thus, the fact that we focus in the basic model on the case where the price-quantity bundles are with 
downstream quantity commitment is, to a great extent, for expositional simplicity. 
5 We also discuss a number of other extensions, such as downstream price competition, unobservability 
of contract terms, etc.  
6 For a review see e.g. Tirole (1988, ch.4), Katz (1989), Dobson and Waterson (1996), Irmen (1998), 
and Rey and Tirole (2003). The set of important contributions is large and includes the influential 
papers of Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987).  
7 Different strands of the literature have focused on other important aspects of the issue, such as the 
role of uncertainty in the selection of contracts - see e.g. Rey and Tirole (1986), Martimort (1996), and 
Kühn (1997).   5
downstream competition is in prices, they have shown that the wholesale price 
contracts are always dominated by the two-part tariff contracts. By allowing the 
downstream firms’ participation in the contracting procedure, we show that the 
distribution of bargaining power may affect not only the contract terms and final 
markets prices but also the contract types that emerge. In particular, we show that 
linear pricing may emerge endogenously; this is important, because, while such 
contracts are observed in reality and have been studied in the literature, in previous 
work on strategic contracting they do not emerge in equilibrium. 
Some recent papers have also considered settings with upstream-downstream 
bargaining. In particular, Dobson and Waterson (1997), Chen (2003), and Marx and 
Shaffer (2003, 2004), using different models, have offered important insights as to 
how the increasing downstream bargaining power can affect the terms of vertical 
trading and the final consumers.
8 However, these papers differ significantly from 
ours. In addition to various differences in modelling firms’ behavior, they consider a 
single upstream firm and do not deal with the endogenous choice of the trading form 
in competing chains, which is our main focus.  
We should also stress that, in contrast to much of the previous work on vertical 
contracting where transactions are restricted to follow either linear or two-part tariff 
pricing schemes, we also consider price-quantity bundles. As, during upstream-
downstream bargaining over contracts, the two parties cannot be restrained from 
putting both dimensions of the transaction (total payment and quantity) on the table, 
one should include contracts that specify a single point in the price-quantity space in 
the feasible set of contracts. Our analysis suggests that price-quantity bundle contracts 
play a key role and they should be observed frequently in reality. This finding is 
consistent with how vertically-linked firms with market power trade in many 
industries: e.g. tour operators make lump-sum payments to airlines (or hotels) before 
the beginning of a tourist season for a given number of seats (or rooms); and airlines 
agree with manufacturers to purchase a given number of aircrafts for a given total 
payment and so on. Thus, the a priori exclusion of the price-quantity bundles from the 
analysis is, on the one hand, inconsistent with some real-world cases, and on the 
other, may lead to flawed inferences about firms’ profits, consumers’ surplus and 
                                                 
8 Other papers such as Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Inderst and Wey (2003), and Inderst and Shaffer 
(2004) have examined the incentives for mergers, investment decisions and product variety in settings 
with upstream-downstream bargaining.   6
welfare: assuming that wholesale prices prevail would overestimate final prices, 
whereas assuming two-part tariff competition would underestimate them.  
  The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we set up the basic model. 
In Section 3, we examine the final two stages of the game, for given choices of 
contract types: downstream competition and equilibrium contract terms. In addition, 
we emphasize the main strategic characteristics of the different contractual 
configurations. In Section 4, we analyze the first stage equilibrium, that is, the choice 
of contract types. In Section 5, we examine the effect of a change in the distribution 
of bargaining power. In Section 6, we extend our model in order to examine first the 
possibility of vertical integration, then the case when price-quantity bundles are 
without direct downstream quantity commitment, and finally the choice only among 
two-part tariffs and wholesale price contracts. In Section 7, we discuss some of the 
model’s assumptions and possible directions for future research. Section 8 concludes. 
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
We consider a two-tier industry consisting of two upstream firms and two 
downstream firms (e.g. input suppliers and final good producers). Each upstream 
firm, denoted by Ui, i =1,2, produces an input facing a constant marginal cost equal to 
c. Each downstream firm, denoted by Di, i =1,2, produces a final good transforming 
one unit of input into one unit of final product.  Each downstream firm has an 
exclusive relationship with one of the two upstream firms. In terms of notation, we 
assume that Ui has an exclusive relationship with Di, i =1,2, and refer to each (Ui, Di) 
pair as a vertical chain. We assume that a downstream firm faces no other costs than 
the total cost of obtaining the input from its upstream supplier.  
  The inverse demand function for the final product of downstream firm Di is: 
   1 0 ; 0 ; ; 2 , 1 , ;            a c j i j i q q a p j i i                             (1) 
where qi and pi are respectively the quantity and the price of firm Di’s final product. 
The parameter  measures the substitutability between the two final products, namely 
the higher is , the closer substitutes the two final goods are.   
  The terms of trade within each vertical chain are determined by a contract, prior to 
any productive activity. Each vertical chain can select among three different trading 
forms or contract types. The first, denoted in what follows by W, is a linear pricing   7
contract, consisting simply of a wholesale price wi that Di has to pay per unit of input. 
The second, denoted by T, is a two-part tariff contract, consisting of a wholesale price 
plus a fixed fee - transfer, (wi, Fi). The third type, denoted by B, is a price-quantity 
bundle (or package) contract, specifying the total input quantity along with its 
corresponding total price, (qi, Ti). In the main body of the analysis, we assume that the 
total input quantity specified in the price-quantity bundle directly dictates the final 
good quantity. In Section 6, we relax this assumption, that is, we allow the final good 
quantity to be lower than the total input quantity specified by the B contract.  
  To capture the idea that trading forms are often strategic decisions with “longer-
run” characteristics than the choice of the exact contract terms, we postulate that each 
vertical chain first selects its contract type and then chooses its specific terms. This is 
a standard assumption in the literature (see e.g. Irmen, 1998). Indeed, the contract 
type may be viewed as representing the form of the relationship between the firms in 
the vertical chain that is manifested in the particular form of organization and 
communication among the parties, and hence cannot be changed very often or easily.
9  
  We assume that both the upstream and downstream firms possess some power 
over setting both the type and terms of the vertical contracts. To keep the analysis 
simple, we restrict attention to the case where the distribution of power is identical 
across vertical chains and, within each vertical chain, across the contract type and 
contract terms negotiations.
10 In particular, we assume that the bargaining power of 
each upstream firm is β and of each downstream firm 1-β, with 0≤β≤1.  
  In particular, we analyze a three-stage game with observable actions. The timing 
of the game is depicted in Fig. 1. In the first stage, the type of contract that will be 
subsequently signed within each vertical chain is selected. We assume that, within 
each vertical chain, with probability  the contract is chosen by the upstream firm and 
with probability 1-  by the downstream firm. As these probability draws are 
independent across chains, while a contract type is chosen in one chain, it is not 
                                                 
9 In Section 7, we further discuss this assumption as well as the implications of considering the case of 
simultaneous bargaining over both the contract type and terms. 
10 In principle, the power that a firm possesses in setting the contract type does not have to be equal to 
its bargaining power over the contract terms as the two procedures often involve distinct layers of the 
firm’s management. Whereas the assumption of constant bargaining power across both negotiation 
stages is adopted here for simplicity (its generalization is straightforward), it can be justified on the 
grounds that the firms’ relative power cannot differ too much across bargaining stages.   8
known whether it is the upstream, or the downstream, firm which gets the initiative to 
choose the contract type in the rival chain.
11 
  In the second stage, bargaining over the specific terms of the selected contracts 
takes place within each vertical chain. For instance, if the contract type employed by 
the (Ui, Di) chain is a two-part tariff then, in the second stage, Ui and Di negotiate 
over the value of both the wholesale price wi and the fixed fee Fi. As is standard in 
the literature, we use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine the 
negotiations outcome - the contract terms - within each vertical chain.
12 We assume 
moreover that, during their bargaining, each vertical chain takes as given the outcome 
of the negotiations in the rival chain; that is, the solution concept employed is Nash 
equilibrium between the two Nash Bargaining problems.
13  
  In the third stage, each downstream firm chooses its final product quantity, unless 
it is engaged in a price-quantity bundle contract which directly dictates its final good 
quantity.    
  We derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the above three-stage game.  
 
3. Contract Terms and Downstream Competition 
 
  Third  Stage: Downstream Competition 
If neither vertical chain has signed a B contract, the last stage corresponds to a 
standard (differentiated goods) Cournot game. Each downstream firm Di, given its 
input price wi and the quantity of its rival qj, chooses qi to maximize its profits: 
                                                 
11 This is the simplest way of capturing the participation of both the upstream and downstream firms in 
the contract type selection and in particular, in negotiations over a discrete choice variable such as the 
contract type. Bargaining has been modeled in a similar way in different settings - see e.g. De Fraja and 
Sácovics (2001), Chemla (2003), and Rey and Tirole (2003).  
12 This way of modelling the bargaining procedures across stages (over the contract type and contract 
terms) is not only for analytical convenience, but is also natural since while the contract types are 
discrete choice variables, the contract terms are continuous variables. Qualitatively similar results 
would also be obtained in the following two scenarios: (i) If the contract terms negotiations were 
modelled in line with the stage one bargaining, i.e. within each vertical chain, the contract terms are 
chosen with probability  by the upstream firm and with probability 1-  by the downstream firm, and 
(ii) if one uses the generalized Nash Bargaining solution to solve the “convexified” contract type 
bargaining problem where the parties are negotiating over the probability with which the upstream firm 
will be chosen to set the contract type. 
13 Note however that, as we are dealing with a compound problem that encompasses two synchronous 
bargaining processes, applying the Nash bargaining solution is not entirely straightforward, since one 
should account for the dynamic interdependencies between the simultaneous bargaining sessions. 
Nevertheless, if there is no exchange of information among sessions while negotiations last and if 
downstream competition occurs only after bargaining has been terminated in both sessions, one can 
show that Binmore’s (1987) observation that the Nash solution is essentially implemented by non-
cooperative, alternating offer and counter-offer bargaining games à  la Rubinstein (1982) can be 
extended to this case too.   9
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Clearly, a decrease in the wholesale price charged to Di shifts its reaction function 
upwards and makes the downstream firm more aggressive in the final goods market. 
From (3), we obtain the Cournot equilibrium quantities: 
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If only one vertical chain has signed a B contract, the quantity produced by that 
chain’s downstream firm has been determined in the previous stage during the 
contract terms negotiations. Hence, the chain’s downstream firm simply transforms all 
the purchased input quantity to output, while the downstream firm of the rival chain, 
which employs either a T or a W contract, reacts optimally to that quantity according 
to equation (3). This corresponds to a standard (Stackelberg) leader-follower game.    
Finally, if both chains have signed B contracts, since the terms of a B contract 
dictate also the quantity of the final product, in the last stage downstream firms 
simply produce the quantities that have been specified in the previous stage; hence 
downstream firms make no strategic decisions in the market competition stage.   
 
  Second Stage: Contract Terms  
In the second stage, within each vertical chain, the upstream and downstream 
firms negotiate over the terms of their already selected contracts. There are nine 
possible subgames. In what follows we will use the notation [X, Y] for the subgame 
where the (U1, D1) vertical chain employs contract type X and the (U2, D2) chain 
employs  Y, with X,Y  {W, T , B }. Rather than going through the cumbersome 
derivation of equilibria for each of the nine possible subgames, we will selectively 
present key intuitive arguments that are required for the determination of the 
equilibrium contracts in the next section. In Tables 1 and 2 the equilibrium wholesale 
prices, quantities and profits for all the possible subgames are reported. 
We start our analysis by stating the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: (a) Whenever a vertical chain employs a B or a T contract, contract terms 
negotiations lead to the maximization of the chain’s joint (upstream plus downstream)   10
profits, 
i i i i D U D U      ) , ( , given the contract terms of the rival chain. Moreover, the 
chain’s profits are distributed to the upstream and downstream firm according to 
their respective bargaining powers,   and  ) 1 (   .    
(b) Whenever a vertical chain employs a W contract, the chain’s joint profits are not 
maximized (given the rival chain’s strategy) and are distributed so that the ratio of 
upstream to downstream firm’s profits is lower than their relative bargaining power, 
) 1 /(    . 
 
An important implication of Lemma 1 is that while both the price-quantity 
bundles and the two-part tariffs are conditionally efficient – i.e. they maximize the 
chain’s joint profits given the rival chain’s strategy – the wholesale price contracts are 
not. Moreover, while under both the price-quantity bundles and the two-part tariffs the 
“pie” (i.e. the chain’s joint profits) is shared according to the firms’ bargaining power, 
under the wholesale price contracts the downstream firms enjoy a larger share (of the 
smaller “pie”) than the one corresponding to their bargaining power. The intuition for 
this last result is as follows. An increase in the wholesale price raises the upstream 
profits by less than the final good output, because such an increase in the marginal 
cost of the downstream firm has a negative effect on final market production and, 
consequently, on the input quantity demanded by the downstream firm. On the other 
hand, the downstream profits decrease by more than the final good output, because an 
increase in its marginal cost makes the rival downstream firm more aggressive and 
this negative strategic effect adds up with the (negative) own-costs effect. In addition, 
maximization of the chain’s Nash product implies that the optimal wholesale price is 
such that the weighted - by the respective bargaining powers - percentage decrease in 
upstream profits and percentage increase in downstream profits should be equal. 
Therefore, the ratio of upstream to downstream profits under the optimal wholesale 
price is lower than their relative bargaining power. 
Using Lemma 1, we can make a number of observations regarding the equilibrium 
outcomes under alternative contractual configurations. If both vertical chains employ 
a B contract, each chain maximizes its joint profits, given the rival chain’s input, and 
thus output quantity: 
 . ) ( ) , ( i i j i
BB
D U q cq q q q a max
i i
i
                     ( 5 )    11
Thus, in the [B, B] subgame, the two vertical chains play a standard Cournot game 
with marginal costs equal to the “true” marginal cost of input c. The equilibrium 
input, and thus final good, quantities are  ), 2 /(    v q
BB
i  where we define  . c a v    
If one vertical chain - say chain (U1, D1) - employs a price-quantity bundle and the 
other chain (U2, D2) a two-part tariff, their interaction is as follows. (U1, D1) chooses 
its input quantity, q1, and simultaneously (U2, D2) selects its wholesale price, w2, each 
in order each to maximize its joint profits. Since the (U1, D1) chain, through its input 
quantity choice, can commit to an equal final good production by its downstream 
firm, it acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting its quantity, to which the rival chain’s 
downstream firm will react as Stackelberg follower in the last stage according to (3). 
Formally, the two vertical chains’ maximization problems are:  
and , ) ) , ( ( ) , ( 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ) , ( 1 1
1
q c w q R q a w q max
BT
D U q                   (6) 
). , ( ) ) , ( ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 ) , ( 2 2
2
w q R c q w q R a w q max
BT
D U w               (7) 
By inspection of (7), the higher the negotiated wholesale price w2 is, the lower is the 
downstream D2’s output (since from (3), 0 / 2 2    w R ) and the lower are the joint 
profits of the (U2, D2) chain. Therefore, the chain employing the T contract optimally 
sets its wholesale price equal to marginal cost,  . 2 c w
BT   As the rival downstream 
firm’s quantity is taken as given when the wholesale price is negotiated, the (U2, D2) 
chain knows that, in the last stage its downstream firm will act as a monopolist on the 
residual demand. It has, thus, no incentive to manipulate the wholesale price w2 in 
order to commit its downstream firm to a more aggressive behavior in the final 
product market. As a consequence, the [B, T] case reduces to a standard Stackelberg 
game with both marginal costs equal to c and the equilibrium quantities are equal to 
) 2 ( 2 / ) 2 (
2
1      v q
BT  and  ). 2 ( 4 / ) 2 4 (
2 2
2        v q
BT  
In contrast to the previous case, when both vertical chains employ a two-part tariff 
contract, the negotiated wholesale price of each will not be equal to the marginal cost 
of input c. In this case, each chain chooses wi to maximize its joint profits, taking as 
given the wholesale price of its rival, i.e.  
), , ( ] ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( j i i j i j j i i j i
TT
D U w w w q c w w q w w q a w w max
i i
i
             (8) 
where , , ), , ( j i k w w q j i k   are given by (4). From (8), we find that the equilibrium 
wholesale prices satisfy:  c a c w
TT
i       ) 2 4 /( ] ) 2 ( 2 [
2 2     . Thus, in the [T,   12
T] case, wholesale prices reflect a subsidy from the upstream firms to their respective 
downstream firms. The intuition is that, by lowering its wholesale price, a chain 
allows its downstream firm to commit to more aggressive behavior. Technically, it 
shifts its downstream firm’s reaction curve out and, as the reaction curves are 
downward-sloping, this results in lower quantity for the rival downstream firm, and 
higher quantity and profit for the own firm. A similar result has been obtained in the 
“strategic delegation” literature, where the upstream firms (firms’ owners) unilaterally 
set two-part tariffs, in anticipation of their downstream firms’ (managers’) quantity 
competition (see e.g. Vickers, 1985, Fershtman and Judd, 1987, and Sklivas, 1987).
14 
Here, we extend this result to the case where both the upstream and the downstream 
firms participate actively in the determination of the contract terms. In this regard, 
notice that the equilibrium level of 
TT
i w  is independent of the bargaining power 
distribution ) 1 , (    . This is because, by Lemma 1, when a T contract is employed, 
a chain maximizes its joint profits (given the rival chain’s behavior). Further, note 
that, while each vertical chain chooses to unilaterally commit to more aggressive 
behavior by setting its input price below its true marginal input cost, in equilibrium, 
the two chains’ profits are lower than those in the [B, B] case, in which the chains 
maximize joint profits on the basis of their true marginal input cost c.
15 This is also 
reflected by the fact that the equilibrium output under T contracts is larger than under 
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The previous analysis leads to the following Lemma. 
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  Now, let us turn to the rest of the cases where at least one vertical chain employs a 
wholesale price contract. When e.g. chain (U2,  D2) employs a W contract, its 
negotiated wholesale price solves:  
                                                 
14 This holds when there is a single downstream firm associated with each upstream. Otherwise, issues 
of “intra-brand” competition arise and, when endogenizing the number of downstream rivals, the 
incentives may be reversed; see Baye et al. (1996), and Saggi and Vettas (2002).  
15 Loosely speaking, one can say that the two chains are trapped into a “prisoners’ dilemma”; while 
illustrative and often used in similar contexts, such a description is not entirely accurate in one respect, 
that the wholesale prices levels do not represent dominant strategies.   13
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where ) , ( (.) 2 1 w w q q i i   is given by (4) when the rival chain (U1, D1) employs a W or a 
T contract. While if (U1, D1) employs a B contract,  1 1(.) q q   is taken as given by (U2, 
D2) and  ) , ( (.) 2 1 2 2 w q R q   (see (3)). The following Lemma compares a chain’s joint 
profits under a price-quantity bundle and a two-part tariff in case that the rival chain 
employs a wholesale price contract. 
   
Lemma 3: The joint profits of a vertical chain are higher under a B than under a T 
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The intuition is as follows. When the (U2, D2) chain employs a W contract, the 
(U1, D1) chain can achieve higher joint profits under a B than under a T contract, as 
long as the wholesale price of (U2, D2) is not lower in the [B, W] than in the [T, W] 
case. Again, this is so because (U1, D1)’s downstream firm acts as a Stackelberg 
leader in the former case, while as a Cournot competitor in the latter case. Indeed, the 
wholesale price of (U2,  D2) is lower when the rival chain employs a T  than a B 
contract. In the former case, (U2, D2) has an incentive to lower its input price w2 to 
make its downstream firm more aggressive in the final good market, while in the 
latter case this strategic incentive is absent, because D2 is a Stackelberg follower 
acting as a monopolist on the residual demand. In addition, a decrease in w2 has a 
stronger positive effect on D2’s output in the [T, W] than the [B, W] case, because in 
the former case the (U2, D2) chain expects D1 to optimally adjust its quantity along its 
downwards sloping reaction function, while in the latter case it takes D1’s output as 
given.   
It should be noticed that in all the subgames in which at least one vertical chain 
employs a W contract, the equilibrium outcome depends on the bargaining power 
distribution. For instance, in the [W, W] case, the equilibrium wholesale price and 
output are (see Table 1):  
and
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i              (10) 
It is straightforward to check that, as the bargaining power of the upstream firm, β, 
tends to zero, the wholesale price tends to the marginal input cost c. Moreover, the 
higher β is, the higher is the wholesale price and the lower the final good quantity.   14
This is in sharp contrast to the other subgames, where maximization of the chains’ 
joint profits implies that the bargaining power distribution simply dictates how the 





i w c w   , wholesale prices are higher under W contracts than 
under  T  contracts. Finally, since under B  contracts competition is based on true 
marginal input costs c, the “imputed” wholesale price under B  contracts lies in 
between the other two cases. An immediate consequence is that aggregate final output 
is the highest under two-part tariffs and the lowest under wholesale price contracts, 
with that of price-quantity bundle contracts lying in between.         
 
4. Equilibrium Contractual Configurations   
 
We now determine the first stage equilibrium. Since the strategy set of each Ui 
and  Di has three elements, {W,  T,  B}, there exist nine possible contractual 
configurations within each vertical chain, and thus eighty-one first stage candidate 
equilibria. The following Proposition simplifies the subsequent analysis by 
substantially reducing the number of candidate equilibria: 
 
Proposition 1: For each upstream firm Ui and each downstream firm Di, i=1,2, a 
two-part tariff contract T is strictly dominated by a price-quantity bundle contract B, 
for all values of  and . 
 
According to Proposition 1, price-quantity bundle contracts always dominate two-
part tariffs contracts. This holds both for the upstream and the downstream firm 
within a chain, regardless of the contract type chosen by the rival chain. The intuition 
for this result is as follows. Recall from Lemma 1(a) that, under both B and T 
contracts, the interests of both the upstream and downstream firm are aligned with the 
interests of the vertical chain. Moreover, recall that both B and T contracts are 
conditionally efficient. Still, the B contracts are preferred to the T contracts, because 
they have an additional advantage that is absent in the case of the T contracts. In 
particular, the B contracts have a commitment value since they allow the chain to 
commit to a certain output level before reaching the final market competition stage.  If 
the rival chain employs either a T or a W contract, a vertical chain obtains higher joint 
profits with a B  than a T  contract, because with the former it can transform its 
downstream firm to a Stackelberg leader in the final good market. Moreover, in case   15
that the rival chain employs a B contract, a vertical chain again attains higher profits 
with a B than a T contract, because while with a T contract its downstream firm is a 
Stackelberg follower, with a B contract it is a Cournot competitor in the final good 
market. Therefore, in the first stage, the vertical chain always “expects” to attain 
higher profits with a B contract than with a T contract.
16  
The next Proposition also contributes to the reduction of the number of candidate 
equilibria by stating that the W contracts are also always dominated for the upstream 
firms (as we show below the same does not always hold for the downstream firms).  
 
Proposition 2:  For each upstream firm Ui, i =1,2, a wholesale price contract W is 
strictly dominated by a price-quantity bundle contract B, for all values of  and . 
 
The intuition of Proposition 2 stems directly from Lemma 1. An upstream firm 
prefers a B to a W contract, because under a B contract both the size of the pie and its 
own share of the pie are larger than under a W contract.  
In view of Propositions 1 and 2, the only equilibria  that  remain  feasible  are:      
[(B, B), (B, B)]; [(B, W), (B, W)]; [(B, B), (B, W)] and [(B, W), (B, B)]. Note that in the 
notation we use here, the first entry within each bracket refers to the contractual 
configurations proposed by the upstream and downstream firm, respectively, within 
the (U1, D1) chain and the second entry to the ones proposed, respectively, within the 
(U2, D2) chain.  
The equilibrium contractual configurations are stated in Proposition 3.  
 
Proposition 3: There exist continuous functions  ) ( W  and  ), (  B  increasing in ,   
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such that: 
(a) The contractual configuration [(B, W), (B, W)] is an equilibrium for  ). (   W   
(b) The contractual configuration [(B, B), (B, B)] is an equilibrium for  ). (   B   
(c) The asymmetric contractual configurations [(B, B), (B, W)] and [(B, W), (B, B)] 
never arise in equilibrium. 
                                                 
16 The expectation here refers to the uncertain outcome of the negotiations over the contract type in the 
rival chain. The chain’s upstream and downstream firm rationally expect that these negotiations will 
lead with probability  to the contract preferred by the rival upstream firm and with probability 1-  to 
the contract preferred by the rival downstream firm.    16
According to Proposition 3, different contractual configurations can emerge in 
equilibrium under different distributions of the bargaining power. Clearly, the W 
contract is not always dominated for the downstream firms and thus the configuration 
in which a vertical chain employs a W contract can arise in equilibrium. In particular, 
the configuration [(B, W), (B, W)] is the unique equilibrium if, for given degree of 
product differentiation, the upstream bargaining power is not too low, i.e.  > B(). 
The configuration instead in which both vertical chains always employ B contracts is 
the unique equilibrium if the upstream bargaining power is sufficiently low, i.e.  < 
W(). Note that for intermediate values of , ), ( ) (      B W    we have two 
equilibrium configurations: [(B, W), (B, W)] and [(B, B), (B, B)]. Fig. 2 illustrates the 
respective regions in the (, ) space.  
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. A downstream firm, while comparing 
a B to a W contract (recall that T contracts are dominated), faces the following trade-
off: although with a W contract the pie is smaller, its share of the pie is larger. When 
the upstream power is not too low (β high enough), a downstream firm prefers a W 
contract because its share of the pie under a B contract (reflected in its power,   1)  i s  
not large enough. Moreover, when the upstream power is high enough, it is likely that 
a B contract is the outcome of the rival chain’s first stage negotiations, and thus the 
size of the pie size that the chain expects to enjoy by also using a B contract is not that 
big. This may provide an additional incentive for the downstream firm to opt for a W 
contract.  
A number of testable implications regarding the type of contracts one should 
expect to observe in different industries can be derived from the above analysis. First, 
only price-quantity bundles are expected to be observed in industries in which there is 
no bargaining. This can be seen from Fig. 3, where the bold line represents the 
likelihood that a W contract will be used by at least one of the chains 
() 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
2        for  ), (   W   and zero otherwise), and the dashed line the 
respective likelihood of a B contract ( ) 1 ( 2
2       for  ), (   W    and one 
otherwise). Formally: 
 
Remark 1: Price-quantity bundles in both vertical chains is the unique equilibrium 
contractual configuration when   = 1 or  = 0, for all values of .   17
By contrast, in industries in which bargaining over the contract type and contract 
terms takes place (0<β<1), wholesale price contracts may also be observed in 
equilibrium.  Clearly then, bargaining plays a crucial role in vertical trading since 
different forms of trading may appear under its presence than under its absence. 
Interestingly, the likelihood of a W contract is the highest for “intermediate” values of 
upstream bargaining power (e.g. for γ = 0.4 when β = 0.129 and for γ = 0.8 when β = 
0.547; see Fig. 3). The second point to make by comparing the two graphs included in 
Fig. 3 is that, the more differentiated the products are in an industry (the lower is γ), 
the more likely is the appearance of wholesale price contracts. This occurs because, 
when the products are not close substitutes, the role of strategic commitment vis-à-vis 
the rival chain becomes less important and that of intra-chain bargaining dominates.  
Finally, one might wonder what is the optimal from a social point of view 
contractual configuration. As Proposition 4 states below, the configuration in which 
both chains employ two-part tariffs is the socially preferred one. In particular, welfare 
(measured as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus) takes its highest value 
under two-part tariff contracts and its lowest value under wholesale price contracts 
(with the price-quantity bundles being in between).  
 
Proposition 4: Welfare takes its highest value when both vertical chains employ two-
part tariffs and its lowest value when both chains employ wholesale prices, with all 
the other cases lying in between.  
 
The above result is a straightforward consequence of the fact that the equilibrium 
quantities are at the highest level under [T, T] and at the lowest under [W, W] since the 
respective equilibrium wholesale prices are lower than the marginal input cost c in the 
[T, T] case and higher than c, in the [W, W] case (see Section 3). As two-part tariffs do 
not arise in equilibrium, the market does not deliver the socially optimal outcome.   
  
5. The Effect of a Change in the Distribution of Bargaining Power 
 
We have established that the equilibrium contractual configuration differs 
depending on the distribution of bargaining power and the degree of product 
differentiation. We have also seen that the firms’ profits as well as the consumers’ 
surplus and the total welfare could substantially differ across the two equilibrium 
contractual configurations, [(B, B), (B, B)] and [(B, W), (B, W)]. Thus, a change in the   18
distribution of bargaining power can affect firm’s profits, consumers’ surplus and 
welfare not only through changes in the contract terms but more importantly through 
changes in the contract types. Keeping this in mind, an interesting question to ask is 
what is the effect of a change in the distribution of bargaining power on the firm’s 
profits, the consumers’ surplus and the total welfare?  
To answer this question, we first determine the equilibrium outcomes 
corresponding to the two equilibrium contractual configurations. We then perform a 
comparative statics analysis with respect to local changes in the distribution of 
bargaining power. Under the contractual configuration [(B,  B), (B,  B)], the 
equilibrium outcomes are the ones reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3, in the boxes 
corresponding to the [B, B] case. Under the contractual configuration [(B, W), (B, W)], 
with probability 
2 ) 1 (    we end up in the [W, W] case, while with probabilities 
2   
and ) 1 (     and   ) 1 (   we end up in the [B,  B], [B,  W] and [W,  B] cases, 
respectively. The expected equilibrium outcomes can then be obtained on the basis of 
these probabilities and the equilibrium values reported in the respective boxes in 
Tables 1, 2, and 3. We start by examining, in the next Proposition, the effect of a 
change in the distribution of bargaining power on the firm’s profits. 
 
Proposition 5:  The expected equilibrium profits of both a downstream and an 
upstream firm may decrease with their own bargaining powers, 1-β and β 
respectively.  
 
  Proposition 5 implies that, contrary to basic intuition or conventional wisdom, a 
firm may benefit from a reduction in its own bargaining power. Thus an upstream 
firm may enjoy higher profit in an industry where the upstream firms’ bargaining 
power is lower; similarly for a downstream firm.
17 Fig. 4 illustrates this point by 
presenting the expected profits of the upstream and the downstream firm as functions 
of β. As can been seen, an increase in the upstream firm’s bargaining power from the 
critical point βB, would lead to an upward “jump” in the downstream firm’s expected 
profits and to a downward “jump” in the upstream firm’s expected profits. The 
explanation for this interesting finding stems from the fact that such an increase in β, 
besides leading to a change in the firm’s share of the pie, may have the more 
important implication of altering the equilibrium contractual type. As a result, it may 
                                                 
17 See also Marx and Shaffer (2004) who obtain a similar result in a different vertical contracting 
context.   19
alter both the size of the pie and the way this is divided. In particular, from the 
viewpoint of a downstream firm, although a reduction in its bargaining power means 
that it captures a smaller share of the pie, it can also imply a more favourable way of 
dividing the pie, due to the possible appearance of wholesale price contracts. From the 
viewpoint of an upstream firm, while an increase in its own bargaining power leads to 
an increase in its share of the pie, it can also lead to a smaller pie and a less favourable 
way of dividing it, through the appearance of conditionally inefficient contracts.   
  Turning to the consumers’ surplus and total welfare, Fig. 5 illustrates that they do 
not only “jump” at the critical value βB, but that they are also not monotonic in β for β 
>βB. An analysis along these lines allows us to address an important question: since in 
an increasing number of markets “countervailing” power of large retailers becomes a 
significant factor, does such a force operate in the benefit of the consumers and total 
welfare? As Fig. 5 illustrates, the consumers’ surplus not only increases when the 
upstream power decreases at βB, but it also takes its highest value when the 
downstream firms’ bargaining power is high enough.
18 This is so because in the 
presence of wholesale price contracts (which could appear when β>βB), double 
marginalization leads to higher final good prices. Fig. 5 also illustrates that welfare 
behaves in a similar way with the consumers’ surplus. In other words, we find that the 
recently observed increase in the “countervailing” power of downstream firms in 
some sectors can, under some circumstances, be beneficial both for the consumers and 
total welfare.
19 The following Proposition summarizes. 
 
Proposition 6:  Consumers’ surplus and total welfare are not monotonic in the 
downstream firms’ bargaining power and may “jump up” as the downstream 
“countervailing” power increases.  
   
Interestingly, as Fig. 5(b) shows, a more even distribution of bargaining power 
can harm both the consumers and total welfare. This is so, because a move from an 
uneven distribution of power to a more even one, may lead to the appearance of 
wholesale price contracts (see Fig. 2). This implies that in industries in which the 
power is asymmetrically distributed among the different production stages, market 
outcomes can be more competitive, than in industries characterized by a symmetric 
                                                 
18 The only exception is when the two products are almost perfect substitutes, in which case 
consumers’ surplus (as well as total welfare) takes its highest value for β = 1. 
19 As long as the downstream power, 1-β, was not initially too low.    20
distribution of power among the firms that operate at different production stages. 
Nevertheless, the opposite could also happen when the goods are close enough 




In this section we consider a number of modifications of the basic model in order 
to examine the robustness of our main results. 
 
6.1 Vertical Integration 
 
Vertical integration (VI) is an alternative way in which upstream and downstream 
firms can be linked. According to Tirole (1988, p.170) “an upstream firm is vertically 
integrated if it controls (directly or indirectly) all the decisions made by the vertical 
structure”. Therefore, VI is an additional long-term contractual relationship option for 
the upstream and the downstream firm, besides the price-quantity bundles, the two-
part tariffs or the wholesale price contracts. One should wonder whether the price-
quantity bundles, that are conditionally efficient contracts, are equivalent to VI. As we 
will see, in our setting, the answer is no. A price-quantity bundle contract  is a 
different strategic option than VI, because of its distinct commitment value. 
We modify our basic model by allowing VI to be a feasible alternative at the time 
the contract type is chosen within each vertical chain. An issue that arises, then, is 
how profits would be divided following a VI. A reasonable assumption is that when 
VI  takes place, the integrated firm’s profits are divided between the (previously 
independent) upstream and downstream units according to their relative bargaining 
power. Both options, VI and B, are conditional efficient. Moreover, in the event that 
both chains have chosen VI, the final market equilibrium outcome is the same as when 
both chains have chosen a B contract, that is, competition between the chains leads to 
a standard Cournot outcome with marginal costs c. What significantly simplifies our 
analysis at this point is that in all the other cases a chain’s joint profits under a B 
contract are higher than the profits under vertical integration. This is due to the B 
contract’s commitment value. When employing a B contract, a chain can effectively 
commit to a certain final good quantity level in the second stage of the game, while a 
VI firm chooses its output only at the last stage. Under downstream quantity 
competition, this commitment has value, and thus, VI leads to lower joint profits than   21
a price-quantity bundle contract. Therefore, since under a B  contract equilibrium 
profits are also shared according to the firms’ relative bargaining power (Lemma 1), 
we conclude that VI is dominated by a price-quantity bundle contract for both firms 
and thus will not arise in equilibrium. The main result is as follows. 
 
Proposition 7: Vertical integration (VI) leads to strictly lower joint profits for a chain 
than a price-quantity bundle (B), regardless of the rival chain’s long-term contractual 
relationship (VI, B, T, or W). 
 
Clearly, in some industries additional considerations (such as informational or 
contractual problems) may make VI a desirable choice. Such considerations have been 
exposed in the literature – here, we raise the point that, if there are contracts with 
commitment value, the choice of VI may not be selected for strategic reasons. 
 
6.2 Price-Quantity Bundles without Downstream Quantity Commitment 
   
In this subsection, we relax our assumption that under a B  contract, there is 
downstream 'quantity commitment', i.e. that the final good’s quantity is necessarily 
equal to the input quantity specified in the price-quantity bundle. Instead, we assume 
that there is 'free disposal', that is, a downstream firm is free to produce any final good 
quantity up to the input quantity specified in the B contract. In this sense, the input 
quantity specified in the price-quantity bundle is a capacity constraint for the 
downstream firm. Moreover, as the total input price has been paid in the second stage 
of the game, it is a sunk cost for the downstream firm in the last stage. As a result, in 
the market competition stage, the downstream firm faces a zero marginal production 
cost up to the specified capacity (and infinite thereafter). This reveals an alternative 
commitment mechanism inherent in the price-quantity bundle contracts. The vertical 
chain, through the use of a B contract, can commit to an aggressive downstream 
competition up to the capacity level specified during the contract terms negotiations.   
Whether or not a contract between an upstream and a downstream firm can 
directly dictate the quantity to be supplied in the downstream market depends on the 
specificities of the market under consideration. In some cases, technological, legal or 
other institutional factors imply that a downstream retailer automatically forwards to 
the final consumers the quantity of the final good that it receives from an upstream 
manufacturer. In some other cases, the downstream firm may be receiving 
intermediate inputs from an upstream supplier and after making the total payment   22
required for all the input units may have the option to simply not use some of them 
('free disposal'). 
We show that under 'free disposal', all our previous analysis holds with no need 
for any modification, provided that the marginal production cost of the input c is not 
too low. Thus, our results turn out to be robust with respect to the nature of 
commitment inherent in the price-quantity bundles. In fact, the marginal input cost c 
is a measure of the effectiveness of the alternative commitment mechanism. The 
higher is c, the more valuable is for the vertical chain to be able to commit to an 
aggressive downstream behavior by inducing its downstream firm to act as a zero 
marginal cost competitor. In contrast, when the marginal input cost is low, a price-
quantity bundle loses a great part of its commitment value. A modified analysis would 
be required in order to determine the equilibrium contractual configurations in this 
case, a task that is out of the scope of the present paper. The following Proposition 
states our main result.  
 
Proposition 8: Propositions 1-6 hold also in case that a vertical chain, through a 
price-quantity bundle B, can commit only to a specific downstream capacity, if the 
marginal production cost of input c is not too low, i.e. if  ) ( ˆ  n c a c  , where 
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of power between the upstream and downstream firm  ) 1 , (    .
20   
 
The intuition is as follows. A vertical chain, say (U1, D1), through the negotiations 
over the terms of the price-quantity bundle, can transform its downstream firm D1 to a 
capacity constrained competitor with zero marginal production costs up to capacity. 
The (U1, D 1) would never select an input quantity in excess of the output that its 
downstream firm will actually produce in the final good market, because by 
eliminating the excess downstream capacity, the chain can save on input production 
costs and increase its joint profits. At the same time, the rival chain (U2, D2) has two 
options if it employs a T or a W contract: Either, to select a relatively high wholesale 
price and abide with its downstream firm being a Stackelberg follower in the final 
                                                 
20 The proof of this Proposition is cumbersome and is thus omitted. It is though available by the authors 
upon request.   23
good market; or, to select a relatively low wholesale price and transform its 
downstream firm to a Cournot competitor in the final good market. It turns out that 
this latter option cannot be profitable unless the marginal cost of input is too low. The 
reason is that the higher is c, the more strategically “distorted” the downstream 
competition becomes and thus the lower are both chains joint profits. In particular, 
(U2, D2)’s joint profits are lower under the (strategically induced) fierce downstream 
competition than those obtained by abiding to a Stackelberg follower role for its 
downstream firm. Finally, if the rival chain (U2, D2) also employs a B contract, both 
downstream firms produce at capacity, resulting thus in a standard Cournot game with 
marginal costs equal to c.   
 
6.3 Wholesale Prices vs. Two-Part Tariffs 
 
In some markets, technological or institutional considerations may make the price-
quantity bundle contracts non-feasible. Accordingly, and for the completeness of the 
analysis, in this section we constrain the choice of contracts to that only between 
wholesale prices and two-part tariffs. Our main findings are summarized in the 
following Proposition.  
 
Proposition 9: If only T and W contracts are feasible, then there exist continuous 
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(a) The contractual configuration [(T, W), (T, W)] is an equilibrium for ). (   WT   
(b) The contractual configuration [(T, T), (T, T)] is an equilibrium for ). (   T    
(c) The asymmetric contractual configurations [(T, T), (T, W)] and [(T, W), (T, T)] 
never arise in equilibrium. 
 
A W contract is always dominated by a T contract for an upstream firm. This is 
due to the fact that the T contracts, unlike the W contracts, are conditionally efficient, 
and lead to a higher share of the pie for the upstream firms than that under the W 
contracts. Proposition 9 implies that the same does not always hold for the 
downstream firms. Indeed, the appearance of wholesale price contracts in equilibrium 
is possible even when the set of feasible contracts does not include the B contracts. 
Under the same restricted contract set, albeit with downstream price competition, Gal-
Or (1991) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995) have shown that W contracts never arise in   24
equilibrium when the upstream firms have all the bargaining power. Here, we extend 
their result to the case of quantity competition since we find that only T contracts arise 
in equilibrium when the upstream firms have all the power. But more importantly, we 
show that their result would not always hold in the presence of bargaining and we 
thus highlight the crucial role that bargaining can play in the contractual procedure.     
We should also point out that, according to Proposition 9, the appearance of W 
contracts is more likely when B contracts are non-feasible. More precisely, the critical 
value of β in the absence of B contracts is lower than the respective one in their 
presence,  βWT(γ)<βW(γ). This is so, because as we know from Proposition 1 B 
contracts are always preferred to T contracts, due to the former type’s commitment 
value. Thus, the wholesale price contracts are less desirable when the price-quantity 
bundle contracts are feasible than when they are not.  
 
7. Discussion and Further Extensions 
 
We now discuss briefly some of the model’s assumptions, in order to highlight 
their role in the analysis and to suggest directions for future research. 
-Asymmetry in bargaining power across chains. To keep the analysis tractable we 
have assumed that the relative bargaining power of upstream and downstream firms is 
the same in the two chains. In principle, we could have situations where the 
bargaining power distribution differs across chains in the same industry.  In such an 
extension of our model, the main results of our analysis would still hold. Specifically, 
asymmetries in the firms’ bargaining power would not alter our finding that price-
quantity bundles are always preferred to two-part tariffs. They would neither change 
the result that only for the upstream firms the wholesale prices are always dominated. 
The only real difference would be that asymmetric contractual configurations might 
emerge in equilibrium, simply because the firms have asymmetric bargaining powers.  
- Contract type chosen together with the contract terms. Following most of the 
literature (see e.g. Gal-Or, 1991, and Rey and Stiglitz, 1995), we have assumed that 
the type of the contract is selected before the contract terms. Such an assumption 
allows us to capture the idea that the selection of the contract type is a choice with 
“longer-run” characteristics than the choice of its exact terms. Why this could be so? 
Because while the exact terms of trade are typically easier to change (perhaps as 
responding to marginal variations in market conditions), shifting from one contract   25
type to another may require a more complicated procedure, e.g. involvement of firms’ 
more senior management and legal departments, or changes in the monitoring and 
trading technology. In addition, such an assumption allows us to capture the contract 
types’ commitment value (see e.g. Irmen, 1998), due to their observability. While this 
assumption might not hold in all the real world cases, we believe that it is plausible in 
many of them, and that it captures an essential feature of firms’ behavior.
21 In our 
setting, if this assumption were violated, bargaining would have to take place 
simultaneously over both the type and the terms of contract. In such a situation, 
conditionally inefficient contracts, like wholesale prices, would not be chosen.  
- Uncertainty in the downstream market. We have shown that, in the absence of 
any uncertainty, price-quantity bundles are always preferable to two-part tariffs. 
However, this result may not always hold in the presence of uncertainty. This is so 
because price-quantity bundles pre-specify the final quantity, and thus, lack 
flexibility. In particular, if at the time that the contract is signed there is demand (or 
cost) uncertainty, more flexible contracts (e.g. two-part tariffs) that involve a marginal 
price may be preferable. Hence, introducing uncertainty in such a fashion into the 
model is expected to generate additional equilibria and to make price-quantity bundles 
less likely to appear. 
- Downstream price competition. In our model, downstream firms produce 
differentiated goods and compete in quantities. Since the mode of downstream 
competition does affect the equilibrium contract terms (and thus, it could also affect 
the equilibrium contract types), one might wonder what would happen if the firms 
competed in prices instead. In the cases in which at least one of the chains would use 
a price-quantity bundle contract, the downstream competition would transform to one 
of (one-sided or two-sided) capacity constrained Bertrand competition. This is so 
because a chain employing a B contract can commit to a certain capacity level (equal 
to the input quantity specified during the contract terms negotiations) before price 
competition in the downstream market takes place. Then if both chains employ B 
contracts, competition in last two stages becomes equivalent to a standard 
differentiated goods Cournot game. This is in the spirit of Kreps and Scheinkman 
(1983), with the only difference that in our setting, capacities would be chosen by the 
vertical chains (through bargaining over the terms of the price-quantity bundles) 
                                                 
21 In some countries, the producers are required to publish their “general conditions” of trade, e.g. 
whether or not they use franchise fees (see e.g. Rey and Stiglitz, 1995, p. 445).   26
before the chains’ downstream firms choose their prices. However, since the price-
quantity bundles are conditionally efficient contracts, it would still be true that a chain 
would behave in equilibrium, in a way that it gets transformed into a Cournot 
competitor. If only one chain employs a B contract, that chain becomes a capacity 
constrained Stackelberg leader, while the rival chain (employing a T or a W contract) 
regards its downstream firm as a monopolist on the residual demand. This then leads 
to a situation which is equivalent to a Stackelberg game with quantity competition. 
Therefore, the price-quantity bundle contracts continue to have desirable features 
under downstream price competition too, since they transform the game to one of 
quantity instead of price competition. In the cases instead that the chains would use 
either T or W contracts, the downstream competition stage would correspond to a 
standard differentiated Bertrand game. It is known that in a differentiated Bertrand 
game the competition is stronger and the profits are lower than in a differentiated 
Cournot game. Thus, while the mechanics of the model would be somewhat different 
under downstream price competition, the basic qualitative features of our analysis 
would remain valid.
22  
- Unobservable contract terms. In our analysis, we have assumed that not only the 
contract types but also the contract terms are observed before the final good 
competition stage. This is a central assumption in the strategic contracting literature.
23 
If we relax it and assume, instead, that the contract terms are unobservable (“secret 
contracts”), then the price-quantity bundle contracts loose their commitment value 
because the input quantity specified in the contract terms is unobservable. Notice for 
instance that, under secret two-part tariffs, the chains would end-up playing a standard 
Cournot game with marginal costs equal to c. The same would happen under secret 
price-quantity bundles. It is easy to see that the two-part tariff contracts and the price-
quantity bundle contracts become equivalent (they lead to the same equilibrium 
outcome) when they are secret. It follows, that under secret contracts, the contract 
choice would effectively be transformed into a binary choice, that among a price-
quantity bundle (or, equivalently, a two-tariff) and a wholesale price contract. Given 
this, one can easily show that the equilibrium contractual configuration under secret 
                                                 
22 The analysis of this alternative formulation is not trivial and is complicated by the presence of 
product differentiation. Our results indicate that, under certain conditions, price-quantity bundles will 
be selected more often because the B contracts have a stronger commitment value under downstream 
price competition (for details see Milliou et al., 2004)   
23 For the implications of relaxing the observability assumption, see e.g. Caillaud et al. (1995), and 
Fershtman and Kalai (1997).   27
contracts would be qualitatively similar to that included in sub-section 6.3, where the 
choice is also binary. It is important to note that since the lack of observability implies 
that a B (or a T) contract looses part of its (strategic) value, in equilibrium, W 




It has been recently recognized that in an increasing number of industries, the 
downstream firms are either as large as, or even larger than, their upstream partners. 
In this paper, we study the implications of the above phenomenon for the organization 
of vertical trading and, through this, for firm’s profits, consumers’ surplus and overall 
welfare. In order to do so, we consider a setting in which both the form and terms of 
trading in competing vertical chains are determined through bilateral bargaining. 
  The existing vertical contracting literature has either examined strategic 
incentives taking the organization of vertical trading as given, or has ignored the role 
of bargaining for the endogenous organization of vertical trading. We demonstrate 
that bargaining has significant repercussions for the organization of vertical trading. 
First, conditionally efficient contracts do not necessarily arise in equilibrium, and 
when they arise are in the form of price-quantity bundles and not of two-tariffs, as the 
existing literature has suggested so far. Second, vertical integration is a dominated 
option and both the upstream and the downstream firm would prefer instead a price-
quantity bundle contract. Third, linear wholesale price contracts that are often 
observed in practice may emerge endogenously; this is important, because in previous 
work on strategic contracting such conditionally inefficient contracts do not arise in 
equilibrium. Moreover, one testable implication of our analysis is that the likelihood 
of appearance of wholesale price contracts is higher in industries in which the 
allocation of bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firms is not 
too skewed and/or in which the products are more differentiated. 
  Our analysis also allows us to put forward the important point that a change in the 
distribution of bargaining power may drastically affect firm’s profits, consumers’ 
surplus and welfare through changes in the form of trading (besides the changes in 
the terms of trading). Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a firm, upstream 
or downstream, might benefit from a reduction in its own bargaining power. 
Although such a reduction means that the firm will enjoy a smaller share of the pie   28
(the chain’s joint profits), it could also mean both a different size and way of dividing 
the pie due to the emergence of a different trading form.  
  Moreover, by pointing out that wholesale price contracts (that lead to high final 
prices) do not arise in equilibrium when downstream firms are fairly powerful, we 
provide support to the view that increased buyers’ “countervailing” power may 
sometimes be beneficial for the consumers and total welfare. Finally, our analysis 
suggests that a more extreme distribution of bargaining power is expected to increase 
the likelihood of conditionally efficient contracts and, generally, to lead to lower final 
market prices. 
  We have demonstrated that our main results are robust under various 
modifications of our basic model. In addition, while some of our results have been 
derived in the context of a linear demand model, the intuition behind them appears 
robust and of more general applicability. While this is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first paper that examines the relation between firms’ bargaining power in 
competing vertical chains and the strategic organization of vertical trading, more 
work needs to be done on the topic. In addition to the extensions mentioned in the 
previous section, this work will hopefully include an empirical study of how the 







Proof of Lemma 1: (a) Let Ai be the transfer specified in a B or T contract. This 
transfer does not affect the marginal conditions in the downstream competition stage 
and, thus, the downstream and upstream gross profits are independent of the transfer. 
Hence maximization of the generalized Nash product with respect to Ai,  
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net profits of the upstream and downstream firms become  ) , (
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D D A         , respectively. Substituting these expressions into 
                                                 
24 See e.g. Lafontaine and Slade (1997), Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Villas-Boas (2002) for 
empirical studies of vertical contracts. Brito et al. (2004) emphasize that upstream-downstream 
bargaining should not be ignored in an empirical evaluation of merger control.   29
(A1), it follows that the generalized Nash product reduces to an expression 
proportional to the chain’s joint profits  . ) , ( i i D U     
(b) It is easy to see that (9) does not lead to the maximization of the (U2, D2) chain’s 
joint profits (except for the extreme cases where one firm has all the power).   
   Regarding the distribution of the chain’s joint profits, note that after taking the 
logarithm of (9), the first-order condition becomes,   
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(A2)       
It remains to show that the term in brackets is smaller than 1, i.e. that an increase in 
wholesale price w2  increases the upstream profits by less than it decreases the 
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because  c w  2  and by (3) and (4),  0 / (.) 2 2    w q  in all cases.  Second, by the 
envelope theorem, we obtain 




















                     (A4) 
because  0 / (.) 2 1    w q  if (U1, D1) employs a W or a T contract and  0 / (.) 2 1    w q  if 
it employs a B contract. By combining (A3) and (A4), we obtain the result.  □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: (a) This is an immediate consequence of the discussion preceding 
Lemma 2.  
(b) We will use two arguments. First, as we saw above, in the cases [B, T], [B, B], and 
[T, B], any output decision maker (i.e. the downstream firm or the vertical chain) 
faces the same marginal cost c. Second, it is well known that for the symmetric cost 
case, the Stackelberg leader’s profits, (U1, D1)’s profits under [B, T], are larger than 
the profits of the Cournot competitors, profits under [B, B], and those are larger than 
the profits of a Stackelberg follower, (U1, D1)’s profits under [T, B].  □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: We first show that 
BW TW w w 2 2  . Let chain (U2, D2) employ a W 
contract. If (U1, D1) employs a T (or, a W) contract, from (9) the first order condition 
for the (U2, D2) chain can be written as:    30
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where ) , ( 2 1 w w q q i i  , i=1,2, are given by (4). While if (U1, D1) employs a B contract, 
the first order condition can be written as:   
, 0
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where  ) , ( 2 1 2 2 w q R q   is given by (3). In (A5) and (A6), it has been taken into account 
that  2 1 2 2 w q q a q       from the first order conditions of the downstream firm D2 
in the last stage.  
  Notice first that, since from (4)  0 / 2 1    w q , the RHS of (A5) is positive, while 
the RHS of (A6) is zero. Moreover, from (3) and (4), we have  2 2 2 2 w R w q      . 
As a result, the sum of the last two terms in the LHS of (A5) turn out to be more 
negative than the respective sum of terms of (A6). Therefore, 
BW TW w w 2 2  . (This result 
can also be obtained by a direct comparison of the equilibrium wholesale prices as 
given in Table 1.)  
 Now 
BW TW w w 2 2   implies that  ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 2 1 2
TW BW w q R w q R  . As a result, the 




D U w w    . Further, 
the latter profits are higher than those that (U1, D1) attains when D1 acts as a Cournot 




D U w w    . □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Lemma 1(a) says that, under both B and T contracts, the 
upstream and the downstream firm share the chain’s joint profits according to their 
bargaining powers. Hence, it is sufficient to compare the chain’s joint profits under 













D U i ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1    , i.e. a B contract leads to strictly higher joint profits than a T 
contract for chain (U1, D1), regardless of whether the rival chain employs a B, a T or a 
W contract (or any convex combination of these).   □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: It follows immediately from Lemma 1.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  Given Propositions 1 and 2, in order for the contractual 
configuration [(B, W), (B, W)] to be an equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that each 
of the downstream firms, e.g. D1, does not have a profitable deviation to B, given that   31
the rival chain (U2, D2) chooses (B, W), that is, the negotiations in the competing 
vertical chain lead to a B  contract with probability  and to W  contract with 
probability 1-.  Taking the relevant profit difference and setting it equal to zero, we 
find that there exists a unique critical value, W() in terms of  , such that:   
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
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 W lim  and 
. 791 . 0 ) 1 (  W   It follows immediately that [(B, W), (B, W)] is an equilibrium for all     
 ≥ W(). This proves part (a). 
In order for the contractual configuration [(B, B), (B, B)] to be an equilibrium, it is 
sufficient to show that one of the downstream firms, e.g. D1, has no incentive to 





D 1 1     equal to zero, we find that there exists a unique critical value, 
B() in terms of  , such that:  
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 B lim  and  . 882 . 0 ) 1 (  B    It follows 
immediately that [(B, B), (B, B)] is an equilibrium for all   B(). This proves part 
(b). Further, it can be easily checked that W()<B() for all 0<γ≤1 (see also Fig. 2).  
Finally, in order to prove part (c) we proceed as follows. We know from (A7) that, 
given that chain (U2, D2) chooses (B, W), the profits of D1 from deviating from B to W 
are higher than under B for all  > W(). Moreover, we infer from (A8) that, given 
that chain (U1, D1) chooses (B, B), the profits of D2 from deviating from W to B are 
higher than under W for all  < B(). Since W()<B() for all 0<γ≤1, it is clear that 
either D1 or D2 have an incentive to deviate for all parameter values; hence, [(B, B), 
(B, W)] cannot be an equilibrium contractual configuration (and by symmetry [(B, W), 
(B, B)] cannot be neither). This completes the proof.     □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Total welfare is given by (see e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984):
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The welfare level that corresponds to each of the six possible second stage subgames 
is found by substituting into (A9) the respective equilibrium quantities from Table 1. 
Table 3 reports the welfare levels for all these cases.    32
We start with the comparison of the symmetric cases. Taking the respective 
differences, it can be easily shown that: WTT >WBB >WWW. Similarly in the 
asymmetric cases, we have: WTB >WWT >WWB. Next we find that WWB >WWW, WTT 
>WTB, and WBB <WTB. Further, taking the difference WBB - WWB, we find that, for any 
given β, there exists a critical value of ,  ) (  , such that WBB >WWB  if and only if 
) (     , with 
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with   . ) 2 4 ( ) 2 )( 16 16 4 6 2 (
2 2 2 2 4 5 6                  K  
Similarly, by taking the difference WBB -WWT, we find that for any given β, there 
exists a critical value of , ) (    , such that WBB >WWT  if and only if  ) (      . The 
critical value of γ is 
1 )] ( [ ) (
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with . ) 2 ( ) 2 4 ( ) 2 )( 16 16 4 6 2 (
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By comparing (A10) to (A11), it follows that  ). ( ) (          Thus, for  ) (      , 
WBB>WWT>WWB, while for  ) (     , we have  WWT>WWB>WBB and for 
), ( ) (            WWT > WNN >WWB.   □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Using the second stage equilibrium profits reported in Table 
2, one can check that:  
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That is, the (expected) profits of an upstream firm are strictly higher in the [(B, B), (B, 
B)] than in the [(B,  W), (B,  W)] equilibrium for all parameter values, while the 
opposite is true for a downstream firm. Now for any given γ, pick β=B(). Then an 
infinitesimal increase in the upstream power β necessarily leads to lower expected 
profits for the upstream firm. Similarly, an infinitesimal increase in the downstream 
power (1-β), starting from β=W(), necessarily leads to lower expected profits for the 
upstream firm (see Fig. 4). (Similar arguments apply for all W()≤ β≤B(), provided 
that a slight perturbation of the distribution of bargaining power leads to a change in 
the contractual configuration equilibrium).  □        33
 
Proof of Proposition 6: Using the welfare levels reported in Table 3 and the second 
stage equilibrium profits reported in Table 2, one can calculate the expected welfare 
and consumer surplus under the two equilibrium contractual configurations [(B, B), 
(B, B)] and [(B, W), (B, W)]. For instance, total welfare in the former case is given in 
the (B, B) box of Table 3, while in the latter case is equal to:   
 . ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
2 2
WW BW BB W W W                          (A14) 
On the other hand, consumers’ surplus equals total welfare minus the sum of the 
chains’ equilibrium profits that could be obtained by adding the upstream and 
downstream profits of the two vertical chains reported in Table 2. Remember that 
under [(B, B), (B, B)] the equilibrium outcome is independent of the bargaining power 
distribution. Hence, total welfare and consumers’ surplus are independent of β for all 
β≤B(), provided that we are in the [(B, B), (B, B)] equilibrium. This is not any more 
true in the other equilibrium contractual configuration, i.e. under [(B, W), (B, W)] both 
welfare and consumers’ surplus depend on β in a non-monotonous way (see Fig. 5). It 
can also be checked that both welfare and consumers’ surplus are strictly lower under 
the [(B, W), (B, W)] than under the [(B, B), (B, B)] equilibrium for all W()≤ β≤B(). 
This implies that an infinitesimal increase in the countervailing power 1-β, starting 
e.g. from β=W(), leads to a “jump up” in both the welfare level and the consumers’ 
surplus (see Fig. 5).  □          
 
Proof of Proposition 7: We proceed by presenting four claims; as the basic intuition is 
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when both chains choose either B or VI, they play a standard Cournot game with 
marginal costs c, while when one chain chooses B and the other VI or T we have a 




























) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1      ; the first inequality by the 
same logic as above, Stackelberg leadership, and the second by the properties of the 







) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1    . This, again, is due to the fact that a chain’s wholesale price   34
(under a W contract) is lower when the rival chain has chosen VI rather than a B 
contract. Collecting the four claims presented above, we obtain the proof.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 9:  It follows from Lemma 1 that W contracts are strictly 
dominated by T contracts for the upstream firms. Thus, the only remaining candidate 
equilibria are [(T, T), (T, T)], [(T, W), (T, W)], [(T, W), (T, T)] and [(T, T), (T, W)]. The 
rest of the proof is along the lines of Proposition 3 proof with the T contracts 
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Table 1: Equilibrium Wholesale Prices and Final Market Quantities 
 























) 4 )( 2 (
















) 4 4 8 ( ) 2 ( 8 2
) 2 8 8 16 (
 
    
    
 
    










) 2 ( 4 16 2 ) 4 ( ) 2 (
 
     
 

















4 2 2 16 32












1 ) 4 ( 8
)) 2 ( 2 4 ( 2 ) 2 4 (
 
      
 






) ) 4 ( 8 ( 2












2 2 ) 4 ( 8














































TB  1  
) 2 ( 4



















































   38
Table 2: Second Stage Equilibrium Profits 
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Table 3: Welfare Levels 
 
















) 4 ( ) 2 (
2 6
) 2 ( 4
 
   

 
   





6 5 4 3 2
4 3 2 2
4 3 2
2
) 16 32 (
) 6 14 12 8 48 32 (
)) 1 ( 3 ) 1 ( 8 (
6 56 96 128 192
4
 
      
     












      
     












) ) 4 ( 8 ( 8
) 16 16 24 16 ( 4
) 4 16 16 (
) 3 28 48 64 96 ( 4
 
    
   












    
   
































) 2 ( 32
28 64 3 48 96

   

   









See [W, B] 
 
 




























Fig. 1: Timing in the basic model 
 
 





  (a) For γ  =  0.8      (b)  For  γ  = 0.4 
 
Fig. 3: Likelihood of W and B contracts 
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               (a) For γ  =   0 . 8          ( b )   F o r   γ = 0.4 
Fig. 4: Expected Equilibrium Profits 
 
      (a) For γ = 0.8                           (b) For γ = 0.4 
Fig. 5: Expected Equilibrium Consumers’ Surplus (ECS) and Welfare (EWe) 
0.2  0.4  0.6 0.8 1
   0.02
   0.04
   0.06
   0.08
   0.1
 
   0.12
0.2  0.4 0.6 0.8 1
    0.025
   0.05
    0.075
0.10
    0.125
   0.15
    0.175
i D E  
i D E  
i D E  
i U E
i U E  
i U E  
i U E
β 
βW  βB 
βW βB
β 
i D E  
0.2  0.4  0.6 0.8 1
  0.25
   0.3
  0.35
   0.4
  0.45
0.2  0.4 0.6 0.8 1
     0.3
     0.4









βW  βW  β  βB   42
Appendix for referees – Not for Publication 
 
Proof of Proposition 8: To prove this result, we need to show that in all the subgames 
where a B contract is employed by at least one vertical chain, the equilibrium when 
the chain is unable to commit to a specific downstream quantity during the contract 
terms negotiations stage remains the same as in the case that in which the chain can 
commit to a specific downstream quantity. In the former case, the chain can instead 
commit to a capacity (equal to the input quantity specified by the price-quantity 
bundle) up to which its downstream firm produces at zero marginal cost, since the 
total input price is a sunk cost for the downstream firm at the downstream 
competition stage. We consider the cases [B, B], [B, T] and [B, W] separately in order 
to find sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be robust under the alternative 
commitment assumption.  
   The [B, B] case: Let Ki be the input quantity specified by the (Ui, Di) chain’s 
contract terms negotiations. Without loss of generality we can restrict attention to 
c a K Ki    , where K  is an input quantity so large that even if the rival chain’s 
capacity is zero, the profits of the (Ui, Di) chain are nil when its downstream firm Di 
produces at capacity. Indeed, as the (Ui,  Di) chain’s profits are negative for all 
K K q i i   , the chain cannot credibly commit to a downstream production equal to 
capacity in this case. Now since Di’s marginal cost equals zero, it is easy to see from 
(3) that its reaction function is given by  ] 2 / ) ( , min[ ) , ( j i j i i q a K q K R    , i,j=1,2. 
That is, the Di’s reaction function is kinked at its capacity level Ki, after which it 
becomes perpendicular to the qi axis. Clearly, if K1 and K2 are large enough, i.e. 




1     a q q . 
On the other hand, if Ki is small enough and Kj is large enough, i.e.  a K K j i   2 
and  a K K i j   2 , the equilibrium is  i i K q 
*  and  2 / ) (
*
i j K a q    .  Finally, if K1 
and K2 are small enough, i.e.  a K K   2 1 2   and  a K K   1 2 2  , the equilibrium is 
1
*
1 K q   and  2
*
2 K q  . The latter implies that, for any permissible Kj, the (Ui, Di) chain 
can induce, if it wishes, a two-sided capacity constraint equilibrium, i.e.  i i K q 
*  and 
j j K q 
* . Since in this case the (Ui,  Di) chain’s profits are maximized along its   43
reaction function,  2 / ) ( ) (
) , ( c K a K R j j
D U
i
i i     , it is clear that the (Ui, Di) chain has 
an incentive to induce such an equilibrium by properly selecting its input quantity. An 
immediate consequence is that both vertical chains have incentives to induce the 
capacity constraint equilibrium and by doing so we end up in the standard Cournot 
equilibrium where  ) 2 /( ) (
* *      c a K q i i .   
   The [B, T] case: Let K1 be the input quantity specified by the (U1, D1) chain’s 
contract terms negotiations and w2 the wholesale price specified by the (U2,  D2) 
chain’s negotiations. As D1’s marginal cost is zero, its reaction function from (3) is 
] 2 / ) ( , min[ ) , ( 2 1 2 1 1 q a K q K R    , while the reaction function of the rival firm D2 is 
2 / ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 w q a w q R     . For small K1, i.e.  ) 4 /( ] ) 2 ( [
2
2 1        w a K , the 
third stage equilibrium is  1
*
1 K q   and  2 / ) ( ) ( 2 1 2
*
2 w K a w q     ; otherwise, the third 
stage equilibrium is an asymmetric Cournot,  ) 4 /( ] ) 2 ( [ ) , 0 (
2
2 2 1        w a w q
C  and 
) 4 /( ] 2 ) 2 ( [ ) , 0 (
2
2 2 2       w a w q
C . Now for any given K1, the (U2, D2) chain has 
two options. First, to induce an one-sided capacity constrained third stage 
equilibrium, in which case (U2, D2) will optimally set a wholesale price  c w  2  in 
order to maximize the chain’s joint profits 




2 1 2 1 ) , ( 2 2 w q c w q K a w K D U       . And second, to induce an asymmetric 
Cournot equilibrium by setting a low enough wholesale price, i.e. 
] ) 2 ( ][ / ) 2 [( ) ( ~
1 1 2 2 a K K w w         , in which case the chain’s profits will be 
) , 0 ( ] ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( [ ) , 0 ( 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 ) , ( 2 2 w q c w q w q a w
C C C C
D U       , or else  





2 ) , ( ) 4 (
)] 2 ( ) 4 ( ) 2 ( ][ 2 ) 2 ( [
) , 0 (
2 2 
   


      

w c a w a
w
C
D U         (a1) 
  Note further that, if  , 2 c w   the (U1,  D1) chain can induce its most-preferred 
equilibrium (i.e. the equilibrium that maximizes the chain’s joint profits given the 
reaction function of the rival downstream firm D2,  ) , ( 1 2 c q R ) by selecting 
) 2 ( 2 / ) 2 )( (
2
1       c a K
S , provided that its downstream firm D1 will do produce 
at capacity at the third stage, that is, if 
S C K c q 1 1 ) , 0 (  . It is easy to check that this   44
occurs if  ) 2 8 /( ) 2 ( ) ( ˆ /
3 2 2 1           n c a c , with  0 ) ( ˆ lim
1
0     n c , 2 . 0 ) 1 ( ˆ
1  n c  
and 0 / ˆ
1     n c .  
 Let  ) ( ˆ /
1  n c a c   and 
S K K 1 1  . If the (U2, D2) chain’s joint profits are not higher 
when it follows its second option (i.e. to induce an asymmetric Cournot game in the 
third stage) then the equilibrium in the [B, T] case coincides with that under 
commitment to downstream quantity. This would occur if there does not exist a 
) 2 ( 2 / )] 4 ( )[ 2 ( ) ( ~ 2 2 2
1 2 2            c a K w w
S  s.t. 




D U    , where 
2 2 2 2 2
1 ) , ( ) 2 ( 16 / ) 2 4 ( ) ( ) , (
2 2          c a c K
S
D U  are the profits of the Stackelberg 
follower. Note first from (a1) that, for the (U2, D2) chain’s price-cost margin and 
) , 0 ( 2 ) , ( 2 2 w
C
D U   to be positive,  ) 2 /( ] ) 2 ( )[ 2 (
2
2          a c w w . However, 
w K w
S  ) ( ~
1 2  only if  ) ( ˆ ) 2 /( /
1    n c a c    , in which case the (U2,  D2) 
chain has no incentive to induce an asymmetric Cournot downstream game.  
  Further, maximizing (a1) w.r.t. w2 we obtain the (unrestricted) optimal wholesale 
price for the (U2, D2) chain,  ) 2 ( 4 / ] ) 2 ( 2 )[ 2 (
2 2
2          a c w
u , in which case its 
(unrestricted) maximum profits are  ) 2 ( 8 / )] 2 ( 2 [
2 2
) , ( 2 2        a c
u
D U . However, 
we have 
u S w K w 2 1 2 ) ( ~   only if  ) 2 /( 4 / /
2       a c . Moreover, 




D U     if  
   2
2 2 3
2
) 2 ( 16
) 2 ( 2 ) 2 4 ( 4 8
) ( ˆ /
 
    

 
     
  n c a c             (a2) 
with  0 ) ( ˆ lim
2
0     n c , 2265 . 0 ) 1 ( ˆ
2  n c  and  0 / ˆ
2     n c . It can be also checked that 
4 / ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ






D U        for all 
) 2 /( / 4 /
2       a c . Therefore, if  ) ( ˆ /
2  n c a c  , the (U2,  D2) chain has no 
incentive to induce an asymmetric Cournot downstream game. Finally, as 
) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
1 2   n n c c  , we conclude that the equilibrium in the [B, T] subgame coincides with 
that under no commitment to downstream quantity if  ) ( ˆ /
2  n c a c  .    45
  An implication of the above analysis is that in the [B, T] subgame, for all 
) 2 /( /     a c , there exists a unique equilibrium which is equivalent to a standard 
Stackelberg equilibrium with both marginal equal costs equal to c. In contrast, for all 
) ( ˆ /
2  n c a c  , there exists also a unique equilibrium which is equivalent to a Cournot 
asymmetric costs equilibrium with downstream costs zero for D1 and 
u w2  for D2. For 
all  ) 2 /( / ) ( ˆ
2       a c cn , the above two equilibria coexist and are Pareto ranked 
with the Stackelberg equilibrium leading to higher profits for both chains than the 
Cournot one. A focal point argument can be used in the latter case for selecting the 
Pareto superior Stackelberg equilibrium. 
 The  [B, W] case: As in the [B, T] case, the downstream reaction functions are 
] 2 / ) ( , min[ ) , ( 2 1 2 1 1 q a K q K R     and  2 / ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 w q a w q R     ; hence, for small 
K1, i.e.  ) 4 /( ] ) 2 ( [
2
2 1        w a K , the third stage equilibrium is  1
*
1 K q   and 
2 / ) ( ) ( 2 1 2
*
2 w K a w q     ; otherwise, it is  ) 4 /( ] ) 2 ( [ ) , 0 (
2
2 2 1        w a w q
C  and 
) 4 /( ] 2 ) 2 ( [ ) , 0 (
2
2 2 2       w a w q
C . Again, for any given K1, the (U2, D2) chain can 
induce (i) a capacity constrained equilibrium, in which case it will optimally set a 
wholesale price  c K c a K w
S      2 / ] ) 2 ( [ ) ( 1 1 2     to maximize the chain’s Nash 
product 
  








2 2 2 1 2 )] ( ) ) ( [( )] ( ) [( ) , ( w q w w q K a w q c w w K B
S ; or (ii) an 
asymmetric Cournot equilibrium by setting  ] ) 2 ( ][ / ) 2 [( ) ( ~
1 1 2 2 a K K w w         , 
in which case the chain’s Nash product, after substituting  2 , 1 ), , 0 ( 2  i w q
C
i , becomes:  











2 2 ) 4 (
] 2 ) 2 ( [ ) (
) , 0 (
w a c w
w B
C                                    (a3) 
  Note further that, for any  , 2 c w   the (U1, D1) chain can induce the equilibrium 
that maximizes the chain’s joint profits given D2’s reaction function 
) , ( ) , ( 1 2 2 1 2 c q R w q R   by selecting  ) 2 ( 2 / ] 2 ) 2 ( [ ) (
2
2 2 1         w c a w K
S , provided 
that its downstream firm D1 will do produce at capacity at the third stage, that is, if 
) ( ) , 0 ( 2 1 2 1 w K w q
S C  . From the reaction functions in the  ) , ( 2 1 w K -space, i.e.  ) ( 2 1 w K
S  
and ) ( 1 2 K w
S , we obtain the (candidate) one-sided capacity constrained equilibrium,  
    2 1 ) 4 ( 8
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Note from (a4) that if  0   ,  c w
S  2  and  ) 2 ( 2 / ) 2 )( (
2
1       c a K
S , which are the 
same as in the [B, T] case. Moreover, that  0 / 2    
S w  and  0 / 1    
S K . Finally, it is 
can be checked that 
S S C K w q 1 2 1 ) , 0 (   if  
   )] 2 )( 2 ( 16 /[ ] ) 2 ( 4 [ ) , ( ˆ /
3 2 2 3                n c a c  
with  0 / ˆ
3     n c ,  0 / ˆ
3     n c ,  0 ) , ( ˆ lim
3
0      n c ,  2 . 0 ) 0 , 1 ( ˆ
3  n c  and  . 23077 . 0 ) 1 , 1 ( ˆ
3  n c    
 Let  ) , ( ˆ /
3   n c a c   and 
S K K 1 1  . If the (U2, D2) chain’s Nash product is not higher 
when it induces an asymmetric Cournot game in the third stage, then the equilibrium in 
the [B, W] case coincides with that under commitment to downstream quantity. This 
would occur if there does not exist a  
  
] ) 4 ( 8 [
}] ) 2 ( 4 ){ 2 ( ) ( 2 )[ 2 (
) ( ~
2 1 2 2   
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S                    (a5)    
s.t. 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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   c a w K B w B
S S S C  
Note first from (a3) that, for the (U2, D2) chain’s Nash product  ) , 0 ( 2 2 w B
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1 2  only if  ) , (
2 2 8
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 , with 
) , ( ˆ ) , (
3      n
h
n c  , in which case the (U2,  D2) chain has no incentive to induce an 
asymmetric Cournot downstream game.  
  Further, maximizing (a3) w.r.t. w2 we obtain the (unrestricted) optimal wholesale 
price for the (U2,  D2) chain,  4 / )] 2 ( ) 2 ( 2 [ 2        a c w
u , in which case its 
(unrestricted) maximum Nash product is  
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with 0 / ˆ
4     n c , 0 / ˆ
4     n c ,  0 ) , ( ˆ lim
4
0      n c , 2 . 0 ) 0 , 1 ( ˆ
4  n c  and  235 . 0 ) 1 , 1 ( ˆ
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can be further checked that  ) , ( ) , ( ˆ ) , ( ˆ
4 3       

n n n c c    for all  ) , (   . Clearly,   47
) , ( ) ( 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
S S S Cu u C w K B B w w B     for all  ) , ( / ) , (      
h
n n a c  
 . Therefore, if 
) , ( ˆ /
4   n c a c  , the (U2, D2) chain has no incentive to induce an asymmetric Cournot 
downstream game. Finally, as  ) , ( ˆ ) , ( ˆ
3 4     n n c c  , we conclude that the equilibrium in the 
[B, W] subgame coincides with that under commitment to downstream quantity if 
) , ( ˆ /
4   n c a c  .  
  An implication of the above analysis is that in the [B, W] subgame, for all 
) , ( /   
h
n a c  , there exists a unique equilibrium that is equivalent to a Stackelberg 
equilibrium. In contrast, for all  ) , ( ˆ /
4   n c a c  , there exists also a unique equilibrium that 
is equivalent to a Cournot asymmetric costs equilibrium with downstream costs zero for 
D1 and 
u w2  for D2. While for all  ) , ( / ) , ( ˆ
4     
h
n n a c c   , the above two equilibria 
coexist and are Pareto ranked with the Stackelberg equilibrium leading to higher surplus 
for both chains than the Cournot one. A focal point argument can be used in the latter 
case for selecting the Pareto superior Stackelberg equilibrium. 
 Finally,  let  )] , ( ˆ max ), ( ˆ max[ ) ( ˆ
4 2      n n n c c c  . It can be checked that  ) 1 , ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
4   n n c c   
for all γ. The previous analysis implies that for all  ) ( ˆ /  n c a c   all three subgames have 
the same equilibrium as under downstream quantity commitment.   □ 
 